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ABSTRACT 
 
A True Mode of Union: Reconsidering the Cartesian Human Being. (May 2012) 
Amber Rose Carlson, B.A., Augustana College; 
M.Div., Princeton Theological Seminary 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Stephen H. Daniel 
 
 When considering the nature of the human being, Descartes holds two main 
claims: he believes that the human being is a genuine unity and he also holds that it is 
comprised of two distinct substances, mind and body. These claims appear to be at odds 
with one another; it is not clear how the human being can be simultaneously two things 
and one thing. The details of Descartes‘ metaphysics of substance exacerbates this 
problem. Because of various theological and epistemological commitments, Descartes 
frames his metaphysics of substance in a way that ensures mind and body‘s real 
distinction from one another. Articulated from this perspective, the problem becomes 
one wherein it is not clear that two completely separate substances can come together to 
form one entity. The aim of this thesis is to show how Descartes can hold real distinction 
and true union without contradiction.  
 To this end, I will first detail the problem and outline a variety of solutions that 
have already been presented. Then I will outline important concepts relating to 
Descartes‘ metaphysics of substance and attributes. This not only reveals the depth of 
the problem but also lays the groundwork for my proposed solution. I argue that the key 
  
iv 
to understanding how these two claims are consistent and in accord with Descartes‘ 
philosophy is through a comment Descartes makes to his contemporary Henricus Regius 
where he urges that the union of mind and body is achieved through a ―mode of union.‖ 
I substantiate this claim by arguing for the intelligibility of understanding union as a 
modal attribute within Descartes‘ framework. Finally, I show how Descartes can hold 
real distinction and true union with consistency. When union is understood as a mode, 
mind and body are able to exist apart from one another, ensuring real distinction. 
Moreover, union construed as a mode does not allow the complete separability of mind 
and body. Thus, when united, mind and body achieve the kind of unity Descartes desires 
for the human being.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Problem of Unity 
 
Descartes is famous for his controversial belief that the human being is 
comprised of two different substances: thinking substance and corporeal substance. This 
claim gives rise to notorious problems with mind-body interaction; commentators 
wonder how a corporeal substance (body) can causally interact with an incorporeal 
substance (mind or soul). Many commentators are skeptical that interaction is possible at 
all given Descartes' framework, and those who attempt explanation come to no clear 
consensus. While questions surrounding mind-body interaction dominate Descartes‘ 
metaphysical legacy, it is not the only problem that arises from Descartes‘ dualistic 
claim. Indeed, before one worries about the plausibility of interaction, there is good 
reason to wonder how mind and body are joined to comprise the human being at all. 
Insofar as mind-body interaction presupposes the unity of the human being, the problem 
of union takes on special import for those concerned with the human being‘s nature. 
Some commentators, however, deny that the union of mind and body is itself a 
distinct problem for Descartes, and would thus take issue with the claim that interaction 
presupposes union. Margaret Wilson, for one, argues for what she calls a ―Natural 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Chicago Manual of Style, 16
th
 edition. 
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Institution‖ theory, wherein the union of mind and body just is ―[...] the arbitrarily 
established disposition of this mind to experience certain types of sensations on the 
occasion of certain changes in this body, and to refer these sensations to (parts of) this 
body.‖1 This view subsumes the problem of union under the problems associated with 
interaction. Adopting this view, scholars can gloss over union and focus on interaction, 
since union is nothing more than the causal relationship between mind and body. The 
problem of union is simultaneously explained by interaction and explained away by it.  
 Wilson can be contrasted with a number of other commentators who believe that 
Descartes treats the problems associated with unity and interaction as two separate—
albeit related—problems. According to those commentators, Wilson is right to notice 
that unity and interaction are intimately related concepts, but she errs when she conflates 
the two. Paul Hoffman agrees with Daisie Radner, who believes that the union of mind 
and body is metaphysically more fundamental than interaction. While Radner argues that 
Descartes' treatment of mind-body union functions primarily to explain interaction,
2
 
Hoffman believes that Descartes' focused attention on mind-body union has a greater 
purpose. Hoffman believes that mind-body union is meant to explain the human being‘s 
nature. Because mind-body union is crucial for understanding the nature of the human 
                                                 
1. Margaret Wilson, Descartes (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 219. 
 
2. Daisie Radner, ―Descartes‘ Notion of the Union of Mind and Body,‖ Journal of the History 
of Philosophy 9 (1971): 159-170. 
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being, Hoffman wants to know how two different substances can come together to form 
one entity, as Descartes‘ writings suggest.3 
I will propose that commentators who focus on interaction are remiss when they 
fail to address the competing claims that catch Hoffman's attention, since Descartes‘ 
preoccupation with both claims is apparent throughout his writings. At times Descartes 
says that the human being is a genuine unity and at others he says that the human being 
is comprised of the two different substances, mind and body. Reformulated from the 
perspective of the individual substances, the same problem is often portrayed as a 
tension between the two claims that mind and body are both really distinct from one 
another and that they are also substantially united when comprising the human being.
4
 
Even from a cursory reading of these general statements, it is not obvious that they are 
compatible with one another in either formulation. At the very least, they are 
troublesome enough that readers can justly require Descartes to give an account of 
precisely how the human being is one thing while comprised of two things. Descartes 
himself is aware of this difficulty; in one letter to Princess Elizabeth, he writes: 
It does not seem to me that the human mind is capable of forming a very distinct 
conception of both the distinction between the soul and the body and their union; 
                                                 
3. Paul Hoffman, ―The Unity of Descartes‘s Man,‖ The Philosophical Review, XCV, no. 3 
(July 1986): 341. 
 
4. Descartes often switches between subjects of predication throughout his discussion of this 
topic. At times he speaks to the human being’s unity, and at other times he discusses mind and 
body’s genuine unity. For clarity, it is important to track Descartes‘ subjects of predication. 
While almost indistinguishable, it is important to notice that they are two slightly different 
problems. One cannot understand the human being‘s unity without a clear notion of how mind 
and body come together. In order to understand the nature of the human being for Descartes, one 
must examine the sense in which the human being is one, and the sense in which mind and body 
are united. In this sense, the latter is in service to the former.  
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for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a single thing and at the same 
time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd.
5
 
This admission is a powerful one, as it tempts readers to decide that Descartes is 
inconsistent on this point.  
 A charitable reader might suggest that the admission of difficulty as seen above 
is not necessarily condemnatory. Yet the problem is exacerbated when one takes a close 
look at Descartes‘ metaphysics of substances. His depiction of the human being as an 
ens per se suggests that the human being is one entity: a genuine unity that is not merely 
two substances conjoined. That is, the human being‘s mind and body are not accidentally 
united to form the human being, but the human being is—in essence—its own entity. 
The detail of Descartes‘ conception of substances, however, indicates that it is 
impossible for mind and body to form this kind of unity. Descartes defines his notion of 
substance in a way that ensures mind and body‘s complete separability from one 
another. Briefly put: each substance has a ―principal property,‖ which constitutes its 
nature and essence. All other attributes refer to this principal property. These attributes 
correspond to the principal property insofar as each attribute must be consistent with the 
nature of the principal property (e.g. color is not an attribute of the mind because it is not 
intelligible for color to apply to a non-extended substance). Because a substance is 
defined in terms of its characteristics, if one can separate out all the attributes of one 
substance from the attributes of another, one can be assured that these two substances are 
really distinct. Descartes believes that mind and body are distinct in precisely this way. 
                                                 
5. AT III 693; CSMK 227. 
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 When mind and body are rigidly defined through their attributes, it is difficult to 
see how they could possibly come together to form a unity. Descartes can easily argue 
for either of these views, but his attempt to hold both of them together seems incoherent. 
Commentators who believe that union is explained by interaction do not solve this 
problem through conflation; they merely overlook a major tension in Descartes‘ 
metaphysics that must be accounted for. These commentators must yet explain how 
reducing union to interaction allows the genuine unity that Descartes seeks for the 
human being and yet maintains the real distinction he also asserts for mind and body. 
Leaving behind those who deny the problem of unity, it is the aim of this thesis to show 
how Descartes can hold these two views without contradiction and in a way that is 
consistent with his larger philosophy.  
 
Proposed Solutions: Denying the Mind-Body Paradox 
 
 There are two main ways commentators respond to the conflict between real 
distinction and true union. Some seek to lessen the force of these claims by denying one 
or the other tenet, while others honor both claims but seek an interpretation of Descartes‘ 
writings to explain away the inconsistency. It will be useful to examine these responses 
in greater detail. 
 Of the first option, it is easy to see how the conflict dissipates when one denies 
either that there is a real distinction between mind and body or that the two form a true 
union. The merit of this stance is that it highlights the difficulty at hand, but it ultimately 
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is dissatisfying because it does not indicate which claim should be denied or the reasons 
for denial. Scholars who choose this route can be further demarcated: (1) some argue 
that Descartes‘ philosophy simply does not allow for both claims; (2) others believe that 
Descartes explicitly makes these claims, but they do not trust that he meant to hold them; 
and (3) some argue that Descartes is not successful in his attempt to argue for them.  
Scholars in the first group are those who take positions like Fred Sommers. In 
this extreme example, Sommers writes that ―a Cartesian person is a non-individual, since 
it is composed of a mind and a body.‖6 Sommers takes Descartes' emphasis on real 
distinction seriously, and so fails to give credence to any claims Descartes makes about 
unity. In this case, taking seriously Descartes' real distinction simply means that one 
cannot honestly believe that the human being is an individual or, thus, a genuine unity.  
Sommers‘ concern is not without precedent. Descartes‘ contemporary Antoine 
Arnauld brings up a similar concern outlined in the Fourth Set of Objections wherein he 
wonders if the real distinction of mind and body proves too much. He writes: 
It seems, moreover, that the argument proves too much, and takes us back to the 
Platonic view (which M. Descartes nonetheless rejects) that nothing corporeal 
belongs to our essence, so that man is merely a rational soul and the body merely 
a vehicle for the soul – a view which gives rise to the definition of a man as ‗a 
soul which makes use of the body‘.7 
Arnauld worries that Descartes‘ claim that mind can be known before and independently 
of body results in a mind-body relationship that is in line with the Platonic tradition. 
                                                 
6. Fred Sommers, ―Dualism in Descartes: The Logical Ground,‖ in Descartes: Critical and 
Interpretative Essays. ed. Michael Hooker (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1978),  
223-233. 
 
7. AT VII 203; CSM II 143. 
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Here the body would be a vehicle for the mind, which raises questions about the extent 
to which the human being is really a true unity of mind and body. Contrary to this 
Platonic view, Descartes asserts a unity of mind and body that is closer to an Aristotelian 
hylomorphism—and indeed many commentators ascribe a kind of hylomorphic 
interpretation to Descartes. Arnauld can be grouped in with contemporary interpreters 
like Sommers because he too wonders if real distinction proves too much in the sense 
that substantial unity is simply impossible.  
 Sommers and Arnauld seem to be justified in their emphasis on the real 
distinction of mind and body. For as Descartes admits to Elizabeth, he spends more time 
discussing real distinction than true union: 
There are two facts about the human soul on which depend all the knowledge we 
can have of its nature. The first is that it thinks, the second is that, being united to 
the body, it can act and be acted upon along with it. About the second I have said 
hardly anything; I have tried only to make the first well understood. For my 
principal aim was to prove the distinction between soul and body, and to this end 
only the first was useful, and the second might have been harmful.
8
 
Sommers picks up on the fact that Descartes focuses on the real distinction. But in 
emphasizing distinction, Descartes does not mean to deny union. Nonetheless, as he 
admits to Henricus Regius, if he is trying to explain real distinction, he knows that it 
would be difficult if he were to teach true union at the same time: 
many more people make the mistake of thinking that the soul is not really distinct 
from the body than make the mistake of admitting their distinction and denying 
their substantial union, and in order to refute those who believe souls to be mortal 
                                                 
8. AT III, 664; CSMK 217-218. 
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it is more important to teach the distinctness of parts in a human being than to 
teach their union.
9
 
No doubt, Descartes admits, there is a disparity between his treatment of real distinction 
and true union, but he explains that this is a calculated decision based on pedagogical 
concerns, not an effort to deny true union.  
 Furthermore, Descartes explicitly avers that the human being is an ens per se in a 
number of places, including his letters to Regius, an advocate of Descartes‘ views who 
was widely known to be in correspondence with him. When Regius publicly suggested 
that the body was only accidentally united, i.e. an ens per accidens, he was confronted 
by his opponents. Since Regius promulgated Descartes‘ views, Descartes was drawn into 
the debate. In January 1642 Descartes writes to Regius in an effort to correct him. In 
response to Regius' erroneous public announcements, Descartes writes: 
And whenever the occasion arises, in public and in private, you should give out 
that you believe that a human being is a true ens per se, and not an ens per 
accidens, and that the mind is united in a real and substantial manner to the 
body.
10
 
Almost directly in conflict with Sommers' view, Descartes tells Regius that the human 
being is, in fact, a genuine unity, as opposed to an accidental unity of mind and body. So 
while it is true that Descartes spends more of his time outlining the distinction (thus 
creating the difficulty with holding both views), he explicitly states that the human being 
is an ens per se. As long as one takes seriously this explicit urging that the human being 
                                                 
9. AT III, 508; CSMK 209. 
 
10. AT III, 493; CSMK 206. 
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is a true unity, any interpretation that denies Descartes' commitment to true unity falls 
short. 
 Not everyone takes Descartes' claims seriously, however, and this brings us to 
the second group outlined above: those who deny claims because they do not trust that 
Descartes really means what he writes. There is much debate concerning the sincerity of 
the claims Descartes makes in his letters, and this is especially true of his letters to 
Regius since they were comments made in order to appease opponents. Skepticism is 
largely due to the known theological and political climate in Descartes' time; it is well 
known that publicly breaking from church doctrine could have very dangerous 
consequences. Because of the political threats involved, comments that are in accord 
with church doctrine are often questioned by scholars. 
 Descartes' claim for real distinction and his claim for true union are both called 
into question on these grounds, as both are driven by theological tenets. If Descartes 
were to have been perceived as speaking against the true unity of the human being, he 
would be severely breaking with church doctrine. Indeed this is the very idea that he 
emphasizes in his corrective letters to Regius. Similarly, he believes that in order to 
argue for the immortality of the soul, the real distinction of mind and body must be 
possible. If mind and body were not really distinct, then the loss of the body would 
necessarily entail the loss of the soul. Descartes admits the theological implications of 
real distinction in the synopsis of the Meditations, where he asserts that ―the annihilation 
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of the mind does not follow from the decaying of the body.‖11 In order for this claim to 
hold, Descartes must show that mind and body are not the same substance. 
The skepticism that grips scholars as a result of these claims is difficult to 
overcome. I argue that it is best to take Descartes' words at face value, at least initially. If 
there are other compelling reasons to deny real distinction or true union, then an 
argument can be made to drop these claims. But since both claims are made on 
theological grounds, it is difficult to argue for the denial of just one claim—and, 
curiously, commentators typically use this argument from skepticism to deny one claim 
in order to grant priority to the other. Since this argument could be used for either claim, 
it seems that the denial of one on the grounds that it is theologically motivated is itself 
suspicious. So, even while the political climate was one in which it would be difficult for 
Descartes to dissent, it is not easy to prove that he did not, in fact, believe what he wrote. 
Just as it is difficult to prove that he sincerely meant what he wrote, it is similarly 
difficult to prove that he was insincere. Scholars who dismiss the need to reconcile real 
distinction and true union based on suspicions of insincerity latch on to a convenient but 
ultimately indefensible position. It is helpful to be aware of the potential ways that 
Descartes might be influenced by the political climate, but we should not stop there 
when his positions become difficult to reconcile. 
 Scholars in the third group believe that Descartes meant to hold both views, but 
that he fails at arguing for them.
12
 If he fails to adequately explain true union or real 
                                                 
11. AT VII 13; CSM II 10. 
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distinction, the concern for this problem is diminished. In the event of such failures, 
scholars have a particular problem to overcome when reading Descartes, but this does 
not resolve the conflict at hand. Regardless of Descartes‘ success or failure in arguing 
for these claims, insofar as his explicit statements are taken seriously, the tension must 
be accounted for. At the very least Descartes seems to hold these views, and so there 
appears to be a major inconsistency. Figuring out just why Descartes attempted to hold 
these views can be valuable for understanding his philosophy overall.  
So far I have outlined a variety of ways scholars engage the tension between real 
distinction and true union of mind and body. Some circumvent the problem altogether by 
suggesting that union is nothing more than interaction. This view is untenable because of 
the textual evidence where Descartes treats union and interaction as two separate 
concepts. Others seek to ease the tension by denying or lessening the force of these 
claims. Of these scholars, some argue that Descartes should not be interpreted as even 
stating both views, others deny that Descartes truly believed the views he was outwardly 
supporting, while others suggest that Descartes is simply not successful in his attempts 
to hold them. 
An additional approach comes from those who honor Descartes' claims and 
attempt to show how they are internally consistent with Descartes' philosophy. Paul 
Hoffman, for example, proposes a promising solution that combines a hylomorphic 
interpretation of unity with a view in which the human being is considered a third kind  
                                                                                                                                                
12. Hoffman, ―Unity of Descartes‘s Man,‖ 341. Here Hoffman cites commentator Étienne 
Gilson as one who denies Descartes‘ success in arguing for true union. 
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of substance. But such an interpretation has far-reaching consequences that are difficult 
to reconcile with traditional readings of Cartesian metaphysics. If true, one wonders why 
Descartes did not explicitly extrapolate them.   
Hoffman takes Descartes' claims at face value, though he recognizes the 
difficulty in doing so.
13
 Despite the difficulty of discerning which, if any, of his writings 
expresses Descartes‘ true beliefs, Hoffman proposes a way in which the competing 
claims for true union and real distinction can be consistent. First, he argues that in a 
hylomorphic explanation of unity, mind inheres in body as form inheres in matter.
14
 This 
interpretation is accepted by many who place Descartes within the Aristotelian scholastic 
tradition, as opposed to reading Descartes with a Platonic view wherein the human being 
consists of a pure mind merely accidentally united to the body.
 15
  Justin Skirry also 
argues for a hylomorphic interpretation. He argues that Descartes‘ notion of unity is 
quite similar to Ockham‘s understanding of unity.16 Putting Descartes in line within the 
scholastic tradition is compelling because Descartes uses form-matter language in a 
number of places when referring to the mind and the body.
17
 
 Some take issue with the hylomorphic interpretation on the grounds that  
                                                 
13. Ibid., 345. 
 
14. Ibid., 349 ff. 
 
15. For example: Lily Alanen, ―Reconsidering Descartes‘s Notion of the Mind-Body Union,‖ 
Synthese 106 (1996): 3-20. 
 
16. Justin Skirry, ―A Hylomorphic Interpretation of Descartes‘s Theory of Mind-Body 
Union,‖ Person, Soul, and Immortality 75 (2001): 267-283. 
 
17. AT VII 356; CSM II 246/ AT III 503, 505; CSMK 207-208/ and AT IV 346; CSMK 279. 
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Descartes very clearly abhorred much of the Aristotelian tradition, and explicitly 
distanced himself from it. Marleen Rozemond argues against Hoffman on a textual basis 
as well.
18
 Rozemond notices that while Descartes does use language which suggests that 
the mind is the form of the body, he never does so to explain mind-body union, though 
presumably he had ample opportunity to do so.
19
 It is curious that Descartes never 
explicitly adopts a hylomorphic interpretation of the unity of the human being in any of 
his correspondence with Regius or Princess Elizabeth. If hylomorphism is how 
Descartes understood this unity, and if Descartes makes use of hylomorphism in various 
places, then one can rightly wonder why he carefully abstains from positing 
hylomorphism as a solution when in correspondence with Regius and Princess Elizabeth. 
 Another popular way some commentators try to explain true union and real 
distinction is by construing the human being as a third type of substance. In addition to 
his hylomorphic interpretation, Hoffman champions this trialist view. He does not deny 
that mind and body are really distinct, but he reinterprets Descartes' ens per se as an 
indication that Descartes meant the human being to be a third substance. Hoffman 
carefully considers the possible difficulties with a trialist reading, and proposes solutions 
to various problems in order to make trialism a viable interpretation.
20
 Most notably,  
                                                 
18. Marleen Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 
139 ff. 
 
19. Ibid., 152. 
 
20. Paul Hoffman, ―Cartesian Composites,‖ Journal of the History of Philosophy (April 
1999): 251-270. 
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Hoffman considers the idea that each substance has a principal property that constitutes 
the nature of a substance, and he argues that Descartes‘ metaphysics does not disallow 
the possibility that a substance has more than one principal property.
21
 
The extent to which Hoffman is successful is up for debate, but commentators 
are uncomfortable with this radical reinterpretation of Cartesian metaphysics. Scholars 
are hesitant to assent to trialism, in part because it is not in line with traditional Cartesian 
dualism. As with the hylomorphic interpretation, opponents cite the curious lacuna in 
Descartes‘ writings; if Descartes meant for the human being to be a third substance, it is 
odd that he never explicitly describes it as such. Rozemond acknowledges passages 
where a trialist reading can be indirectly supported, but she believes that these passages 
are too vague to be definitive and ultimately denies that Descartes meant the human 
being as a third substance.
22
 Dan Kaufman is another commentator who denies 
Hoffman‘s trialist reading. He disagrees with Hoffman on the grounds that in virtue of 
mind and body‘s different natures, they can enjoy—at best—a unity of composition, and 
this type of unity is not a kind required for labeling the human being a third substance.
23
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21. Ibid. 
 
22. Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism, 165 ff. 
 
23. Dan Kaufman, ―Descartes on Composites, Incomplete substances, and Kinds of Unity,‖ 
Archiv für Geschichte Der Philosophie 90 (2008): 39-73. For another commentator who denies 
trialism see Eugenio E. Zaldivar, ―Descartes Theory of Substance: Why He Was Not a Trialist,‖ 
British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2011): 395–418.  
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A New Proposal 
 
 It is easy to see how there is no clear consensus regarding the best approach to 
this problem. Some deny the problem altogether, while others find various ways to 
lessen the force of the tension, usually by denying a claim for one reason or another. Yet 
others attempt to reconcile these views with one another by appealing to solutions that 
result in commitments that are far afield from traditionally accepted Cartesian views. My 
thesis will suggest an alternate way to explain how Descartes can maintain doctrines of 
real distinction and true union without contradiction.  
To this end, Chapter Two will outline the details of Cartesian substances. In 
particular it will examine Cartesian substances and attributes while noting their 
implications for real distinction and true union. This will not only reveal the depths of 
the problem at hand, but will also lay the groundwork for later chapters. Chapter Three 
will explore the possibility that union is best understood as a mode of union. Drawing 
heavily upon the definitions and distinctions made in Chapter Two, this chapter will 
investigate the role of modes and their relation to substances in an effort to show how 
mind and body can be really distinct when union is understood as a mode. I argue that 
Descartes‘ ability to hold real distinction hinges upon his ability to understand union as a 
mode and so the bulk of this chapter will argue for the intelligibility of calling union a 
mode. Chapter Four will then take up the implications of this interpretation. Recalling 
that the aim of this thesis is to show how Descartes can hold real distinction and true 
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union simultaneously, this chapter will consider the possibility of maintaining real 
distinction amidst union, and conversely union amidst real distinction. Finally, Chapter 
Five will conclude by addressing potential concerns generated by my proposed solution. 
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CHAPTER II 
CARTESIAN SUBSTANCES 
 
Meditative Beginnings 
 
 In his Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes proceeds through his innovative 
epistemological method. Beginning by doubting away everything, Descartes realizes that 
he cannot doubt away his own mind, and so ensures knowledge of his own existence. 
Later, with the help of God and the surety of God‘s goodness, Descartes comes to have 
knowledge of the existence of corporeal substance and the human body. This process 
made Descartes famous for his ground-breaking (even if problematic) epistemology, and 
it is in the Meditations that readers catch glimpses of his nascent dualism. Because of the 
way his epistemological method unfolds, Descartes is neatly poised to argue that mind 
and body are substances completely separate from one another. This real distinction, 
then, is not only crucial for its theological implications, but also for its epistemological 
ones. In the Meditations, Descartes explains: 
First, I know that everything which I clearly and distinctly understand is capable 
of being created by God so as to correspond exactly with my understanding of it. 
Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from 
another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they 
are capable of being separated, at least by God. The question of what kind of 
power is required to bring about such a separation does not affect the judgment 
that the two things are distinct. Thus, simply by knowing that I exist and seeing 
at the same time that absolutely nothing else belongs to my nature or essence 
except that I am a thinking thing, I can infer correctly that my essence consists 
solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. It is true that I may have (or, to 
anticipate, that I certainly have) a body that is very closely joined to me. But, 
nevertheless, on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of body, in so far as 
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this is simply an extended, non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that 
I am really distinct from my body, and can exist without it.
24
 
Here Descartes argues that the human mind can exist apart from the body. This idea is 
crucial for any claims about the immortality of the soul. The first line in the argument 
has to do with one‘s ability to have ―clear and distinct‖ ideas, and these terms are 
essential to many of his epistemological (and thus metaphysical) arguments. In the 
Principles Descartes explains what he means by ‗clear‘ and ‗distinct‘: 
I call a perception ‗clear‘ when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind – 
just as we say that we see something clearly when it is present to the eye‘s gaze 
and stimulates it with a sufficient degree of strength and accessibility. I call a 
perception ‗distinct‘ if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all 
other perceptions that it contains within itself only what is clear.
25
 
A perception is clear when it is accessible to the mind, and it is distinct if it is separated 
from all other perceptions. Pain is an example of a perception that it clear, but not 
distinct.
26
 If one has a clear and distinct idea of something, one can trust in this 
perception due to the goodness of God. In addition to his comments in the passage 
above, Descartes avers: 
It is certain, however, that we will never mistake the false for the true provided 
we give our assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive. I say that this 
is certain, because God is not a deceiver, and so the faculty of perception which 
he has given us cannot incline to falsehood;
27
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Because God is good, we can trust that there is correspondence between our clear and 
distinct perceptions and their truth. Here Descartes is explaining clarity and distinctness 
in terms of perception, but the explanation carries over to clear and distinct ideas as well: 
For when we come to know God, we are certain that he can bring about anything 
of which we have a distinct understanding. For example, even though we may 
not yet know for certain that any extended or corporeal substance exists in 
reality, the mere fact that we have an idea of such a substance enables us to be 
certain that it is capable of existing.
28
 
In addition to our perceptions, then, Descartes also believes that our ability to have a 
clear and distinct idea yields a similar result; when one has a clear and distinct idea, one 
can be assured of its possible existence.  
 Taking this idea further into the realm of substances, Descartes argues that 
because of his epistemological method wherein he can know that he exists as a thinking 
thing without any surety of his body, mind and body must be different entities. Even 
though the mind is very closely joined to the body, his epistemological path shows that 
one can know mind clearly and distinctly before having knowledge of body. Later it 
becomes obvious to Descartes that one has a distinct and clear notion of the body insofar 
as it is an extended thing and not a thinking thing.  
 Again in the Meditations Descartes continues to explain the repercussions of 
clarity and distinctness for the substances mind and body: 
Besides this, I find in myself faculties for certain special modes of thinking, 
namely imagination and sensory perception. Now I can clearly and distinctly 
understand myself as a whole without these faculties; but I cannot, conversely, 
understand these faculties without me, that is, without an intellectual substance to 
inhere in. This is because there is an intellectual act included in their essential  
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definition; and hence I perceive that the distinction between them and myself 
corresponds to the distinction between the modes of a thing and the thing itself. 
Of course I also recognize that there are certain other faculties (like those of 
changing position, of taking on various shapes, and so on) which, like sensory 
perception and imagination, cannot be understood apart from some substance for 
them to inhere in, and hence cannot exist without it. But it is clear that these 
other faculties, if they exist, must be in a corporeal or extended substance and not 
an intellectual one; for the clear and distinct conception of them includes 
extension, but does not include any intellectual act whatsoever.
29
 
Already in the Meditations Descartes thus gestures towards the relationship between 
attributes and substances. He notices that there are certain modes of thinking which he 
cannot understand apart from the substance in which they inhere. He also notes that he 
can nonetheless have a distinct understanding of his mind without these particular 
modes. He makes similar observations about the modes of corporeal substance. Finally, 
he reflects upon the nature of these modes and uses them to draw a distinction between 
the substances of mind and body. Because the clear and distinct idea of shape, for 
example, cannot be understood apart from its inhering in an extended substance, 
attributes of thinking can be distinguished from attributes of extension.  
 These two lengthy passages from the Meditations are good places to begin an 
investigation of the nature of substances, since his metaphysics is so clearly informed by 
his epistemology. In addition to the theological impetus for real distinction, there is also 
an epistemological drive. Real distinction falls out of Descartes‘ epistemology because 
of his careful methodological doubting. Through these observations, Descartes has 
already begun in the Meditations to gesture in the direction of a specific definition of 
substances wherein attributes play a defining and informative role. But his treatment 
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here is somewhat vague, and commentators notice his weak conclusion; at the end of his 
ruminations on real distinction in the Meditations, he concludes that mind and body can 
be distinct. Commentators find it odd that he does not conclude that mind and body are 
in fact distinct. This worry will be taken up later, but for now it is enough to notice that 
Descartes is already deeply invested in the real distinction of mind and body, and that 
real distinction is intimately tied to a substance‘s attributes. He outlines these concepts in 
further detail later in his Principles.  
 
Substances and Attributes 
 
 In the Principles, Descartes defines substance:  
By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a 
way as to depend upon no other thing for its existence. And there is only one 
substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing whatsoever, 
namely God.
30
 
Descartes‘ primary definition is one where a substance depends upon nothing else for its 
existence. Defined in this way, only God is a substance. But Descartes recognizes other 
substances that do not fit this description. These substances differ insofar as they are 
created. Because of their created nature, they require divine concurrence in order to 
exist: 
In the case of all other substances, we perceive that they can exist only with the 
help of God's concurrence. Hence the term 'substance' does not apply univocally, 
as they say in the Schools, to God and to other things; that is, there is no 
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distinctly intelligible meaning of the term which is common to God and his 
creatures.
31
 
Other substances depend upon God's concurrence for their continued existence, but this 
is a very different definition of substance than he initially proposed. The term 'substance' 
is equivocal in meaning—it does not apply to God and created substance in the same 
respect. It is the created substance that Descartes is concerned with in his notion of the 
human being, and so it is created substance that this thesis is concerned with.
32
  
 Regarding created things, Descartes draws a further distinction between 
substances and their attributes:  
In the case of created things, some are of such a nature that they cannot exist 
without other things, while some need only the ordinary concurrence of God in 
order to exist. We make this distinction by calling the latter 'substances' and the 
former 'qualities' or 'attributes' of those substances.
33
 
Descartes‘ delineation of substance and attributes echoes the claims he makes in the 
Meditations. Created substances need only divine concurrence to exist, but attributes 
cannot exist without other things (namely, substances). When one asks ‗What is a 
substance, according to Descartes?‘ the answer will first note a distinction between 
God—the substance that depends upon nothing else for its existence—and created 
substances that depend upon nothing other than God for existence. This answer—while 
expressing a fundamental definition of substance—does not explain how to discern one 
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created substance from another, and it is created substances that are important in the 
quest for the nature of the human being.  
For Descartes, the nature of a substance is revealed by its attributes. Descartes 
believes that wherever one encounters an attribute, there must be some kind of substance 
underlying it, since:  
nothingness possesses no attributes or qualities. It follows that, wherever we find 
some attributes or qualities, there is necessarily some thing or substance to be 
found for them to belong to; and the more attributes we discover in the same 
thing or substance, the clearer is our knowledge of that substance.
34
 
Not only does the perception of attributes denote that there is some substance present, 
but it also allows one to know the nature of a substance. The more one knows of a 
substance‘s attributes, the clearer picture one has of the substance. But having a clear 
picture of a substance is not the result of merely noticing a heap of attributes in the same 
time and space. In an effort to define a substance more precisely by its attributes, he says 
that ―a substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but each substance 
has one principal property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its 
other properties are referred.‖35 Thus the ―principal property‖ can be thought of as the 
defining property of a substance. Each substance has one property that defines its 
essence, and any other attribute of that substance refers to the principal property. Of 
mind and body, Descartes assigns the principal properties extension and thought, 
respectively: ―Thus extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of 
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corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance.‖36 Of the 
created substances mind and body, thinking and extension denote their respective 
essences. All attributes the mind must refer to thinking while all attributes of body must 
refer to extension.  
When Descartes says that all other attributes refer to a substance's principal 
property, he means that these attributes must correspond to the principal attribute in 
intelligible ways. Descartes offers some helpful examples: 
Everything else which can be attributed to body presupposes extension, and is 
merely a mode of an extended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind 
is simply one of the various modes of thinking. For example, shape is 
unintelligible except in an extended thing; and motion is unintelligible except as 
motion in an extended space; while imagination, sensation and will are 
intelligible only in a thinking thing.
37
 
The principal property of corporeal substance is extension, and since it does not make 
sense to think of imagination, for example, as extended, one knows that imagination 
does not properly belong to corporeal substance. Similarly, it is not intelligible to ascribe 
color or shape to incorporeal thinking substance.  
Descartes uses a number of terms to describe the characteristics of a substance. 
He reserves the term ‗principal property‘ to denote the defining characteristic of a 
substance, but he seems to use ‗attribute,‘ ‗quality,‘ and ‗mode,‘ somewhat 
interchangeably: 
By mode, as used above, we understand exactly the same as what is elsewhere  
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meant by an attribute or quality. But we employ the term mode when we are 
thinking of a substance as being affected or modified; when the modification 
enables the substance to be designated as a substance of such and such a kind, we 
use the term quality; and finally, when we are simply thinking in a more general 
way of what is in a substance, we use the term attribute.
38
 
The meanings of these terms are difficult to tease out. Instead of suggesting that these 
different terms correspond to different classes of (ontologically) real characters, these 
distinctions seem to denote mere differences in linguistic function. The first sentence 
reveals that these distinctions are not rigid. A ‗mode‘ is also an ‗attribute‘ or a ‗quality.‘ 
He goes on to explain what we mean when we use these different terms. When speaking 
about characteristics in general, we refer to them as attributes. When desiring additional 
specificity—i.e. when wanting to distinguish between different substances—we can refer 
to qualities. Finally, when wanting to highlight the aspect that characters are accidental 
variations of a substance, we can refer to modes.  
All of these are distinguished in kind, however, from ‗principal properties.‘ 
Borrowing from the Aristotelian tradition, principal properties are those that are essential 
to the substance. Thinking substance cannot exist without thought, and similarly 
corporeal substance cannot exist without extension. What Descartes terms attributes, 
qualities, and modes are different from principal properties insofar as they do not 
constitute the essence of a substance. Modes are accidental variations. They are 
expressions of the principal properties, but strictly speaking they are characters that 
could be different without threatening the existence or nature of the substance. Color is a 
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good example of a mode in extended substance. A chair might be brown or red, but this 
color is not essential to its essence as an extended, corporeal substance. 
When Descartes says that modes are the same as qualities and attributes, there is 
reason to think that these terms are meant to aid discussion about the characters of a 
substance rather than posit multiple types of characters. Indeed, it is not easy to imagine 
a character that is neither a mode of substance nor a principal property. As they are 
defined, a principal property is the character that defines the essence of a substance, and 
all other attributes refer to this property. This distinction suggests that there is a 
difference in kind between principal properties and attributes—a difference wherein 
principal properties are essential to a substance and other attributes are accidental. The 
passage above collapses attributes, qualities, and modes together in the important sense 
that they are all accidental properties, but one can employ the terms ‗attribute‘ and 
‗quality‘ for specific clarification purposes; and this has important implications for 
understanding the relationship between substances and attributes. 
As we saw earlier, Descartes admits that attributes are dependent upon 
substances, in that they are not entities in themselves, but are dependent upon substances 
for their existence. This phrasing is somewhat misleading. In fact, Descartes is adamant 
that attributes are not real entities at all. Attributes do not exist in an ontologically real 
sense: 
I do not suppose there are in nature any real qualities, which are attached to 
substances, like so many little souls to their bodies, and which are separable from 
them by divine power. Motion, and all the other modifications of substance 
which are called qualities, have no greater reality, in my view, than is commonly 
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attributed by philosophers to shape, which they call only a mode and not a real 
quality.
39
 
That a quality has no ontological independence is consistent with the interpretation that 
when Descartes distinguishes between attributes, qualities, and modes, he is really 
distinguishing between ways of using natural language to specify concepts—he is not 
suggesting that there are multiple, rigidly defined classes of substances that enjoy 
ontological independence. Attributes, qualities, and modes are expressions of the 
principal property, which denote the essence of a substance, but are not real entities like 
substances are, nor are they essential features of a substance.   
 In sum, created substances have one principal property that constitutes the nature 
and essence of the substance. All other attributes must refer to this principal property, 
else they would be unintelligible. Mind and body are defined by thinking and extension, 
respectively. Thus, all attributes of mind must refer to thinking while all attributes of 
body must refer to extension. Additionally, it is important to note that attributes are not 
ens; they do not enjoy ontological independence. Indeed, they are defined by their 
dependence upon the substances in which they inhere. Finally, Descartes draws a 
distinction in kind between principal properties and other properties of a substance in 
terms of their essential or accidental relationship to substance. While Descartes uses a 
variety of terms to more easily discuss the accidental characters of a substance, unless it 
is the principal property, it is accidental and therefore what Descartes calls ‗modal.‘ The 
ways Descartes defines substances in terms of its attributes puts him in a good position 
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to posit the real distinction of mind and body. Since ‗real distinction‘ is a technical term 
for Descartes, it is important to examine his precise meaning.  
 
A Few Distinctions 
 
The way Descartes defines substance and its relationship to properties and 
attributes allows him to ensure the real distinction of mind and body, which is a notion at 
the heart of a human being‘s nature. In the Principles Descartes differentiates between 
multiple distinction types. He says that ―[...] distinction can be taken in three ways: as a 
real distinction, a modal distinction, or a conceptual distinction.‖40 Real distinctions 
hold only between substances. A modal distinction is one that holds between a mode and 
the substance in which it inheres or between two modes of the same substance.
41
 For 
example, a modal distinction is the difference between color in an extended substance 
and the extended substance itself, or it might be the difference between color and shape 
(two modes) of an extended substance. A conceptual distinction is a distinction between 
a substance and the attributes that make it intelligible or between the attributes of a 
substance: 
a conceptual distinction is  a distinction between a substance and some attribute 
of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is 
a distinction between two such attributes of a single substance.
42
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On the surface, it is tempting to think that the difference between a modal distinction and 
a conceptual distinction is that a modal distinction obtains between modes, while a 
conceptual distinction obtains between attributes. But we just noticed that the difference 
between modes and attributes is a difference in language, not a difference in kind. 
Instead, by differentiating conceptual distinctions from modal ones, Descartes is picking 
out a peculiar class of attributes: those which, if lacking, a substance is unintelligible. 
Often this means that the substance would cease to exist without these attributes. 
Descartes offers the relationship between duration and a substance as an example of a 
conceptual distinction. It is not intelligible to think about a substance without thinking of 
it as enduring through time. A substance without duration is a substance that does not 
exist.  
 Both modal and conceptual distinctions are different from a real distinction 
insofar as only a real distinction is applied to the distinction between substances. Real 
distinction, as noted earlier, is marked by one‘s ability to have a clear and distinct idea of 
something. Descartes defines real distinction against modal or conceptual distinction: 
strictly speaking, a real distinction exists only between two or more substances; 
and we can perceive that two substances are really distinct simply from the fact 
that we can clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the other.
43
 
 
As noted earlier, in order to have a clear and distinct idea, they must be completely 
separable in terms of their attributes: 
Thus, we can easily have two clear and distinct notions or ideas, one of created 
thinking substance, and the other of corporeal substance, provided we are careful  
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to distinguish all the attributes of thought from the attributes of extension.
44
 
Since the attributes of a substance must refer to their respective principal properties in a 
way that renders them intelligible, Descartes is confident that one can know that mind 
and body are really distinct. To demonstrate this, all one must do is separate out all the 
attributes of one from the attributes of another. Because of the way he has defined 
substances, it is possible for the human being to know that mind and body are really 
distinct: 
This is the best way to discover the nature of the mind and the distinction 
between the mind and the body. For if we, who are supposing that everything 
which is distinct from us is false, examine what we are, we see very clearly that 
neither extension nor shape nor local motion, nor anything of this kind which is 
attributable to a body, belongs to our nature, but that thought alone belongs to it. 
So our knowledge of our thought is prior to, and more certain than, our 
knowledge of any corporeal thing; for we have already perceived it, although we 
are still in doubt about other things.
45
 
This passage indicates that it is through the orderly epistemological method put forth  in 
the Meditations, that real distinction is discovered. Beginning with doubt, one can doubt 
away the body, but not the mind. For this to be possible, it must be the case that one can 
have clear and distinct notions of the mind and the body separate from one another. 
Because this process reveals that nothing corporeal belongs to the nature of the human 
being, it must be the case that Descartes can have a clear and distinct idea of mind and 
body. Were his ideas not clear and distinct, he would not have the ability to doubt away 
corporeal substance. Furthermore, because of the way he defines substances and clear 
and distinct ideas, it must be the case that all attributes of mind are, in fact, different 
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from all the attributes of body. When mind and body share no attributes, they are 
completely different substances. Descartes thus ensures their real distinction from one 
another. When considering the nature of the human being, this generates devastating 
(though, I argue, not ultimately insurmountable) complications. 
Problematic Implications 
 
 Initially the problem at hand was generally expressed as a question concerning 
the nature of the human being. Since the human being is an ens per se, it is one thing, yet 
it is comprised of the two things mind and body. The surface level problem concerns 
how the human being can be simultaneously two things and one thing, and Descartes 
admits this difficulty. Reframed from another perspective, there is an almost 
imperceptibly different problem from the standpoint of the substances mind and body. 
Still in service to the overarching question ‗What is the nature of Descartes‘ human 
being?‘ it is not obvious how two things, mind and body, can come together to form one 
thing. So what is the mechanism or explanation for how this union is possible? 
 By delving into the details of the Cartesian metaphysics of substances, we are 
able to see the impetus behind the real distinction of mind and body. Not only are 
theological concerns for the immortality of the soul at stake, but Descartes‘ 
epistemology is likewise threatened by the possibility that mind and body are not really 
distinct. As he notes in the Principles, however, recognizing that there is a real 
distinction between mind and body is central to his epistemology: 
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we can also be certain that, if it exists, each and every part of it, as delimited by 
us in our thought, is really distinct from the other parts of the same substance. 
Similarly, from the mere fact that each of us understands himself to be a thinking 
thing and is capable, in thought, of excluding from himself every other substance, 
whether thinking or extended, it is certain that each of us, regarded in this way, is 
really distinct from every other thinking substance and from every corporeal 
substance.
46
  
Because his epistemological method follows the orderly progression that is based on his 
ability to know that his mind is different from his body, if mind and body were not really 
distinct, Descartes could not progress through his epistemological method. That is, he 
bases his knowledge of the self and subsequently the world around him on his ability to 
clearly and distinctly perceive his mind as separate from his body. If he were not able to 
doubt away the material world, he would not able to discern the existence of his mind as 
such, and the sure existence of his mind is the foundation for the possibility of all other 
knowledge. Not only would the immortality of the soul be threatened by his inability to 
separate mind from body, but he would likewise not be able to distinguish himself from 
other entities. Indeed, our inability to have really distinct concepts threatens our ability 
to have knowledge of the world at all.  
  Descartes, then, is committed to the real distinction of mind and body for a 
variety of reasons that are fundamental to his overall philosophical project. His need to 
maintain real distinction is evident in the way he conceives of substances. Because they 
are defined by their principal properties, and because all other attributes must refer to 
their principal property, Descartes is able to posit a way for one to know mind and body 
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are really distinct. Again, because of the goodness of God, one is then able to know that 
mind and body are, in fact, really distinct substances.  
 This reveals the pervasiveness of the problem for Descartes. Not only is the 
problem one of attempting to conceive of two things as one thing, but it is also a 
problem trying to figure out how two substances that are defined by their complete 
separation from one another could possibly come together. It seems that (1) it might not 
be possible to conjoin them at all, and (2) that if they were joined, they would lose their 
essential and distinguishing features. One can rightly wonder how, when joined, mind 
and body are still the same substances as defined when separated from one another. 
Given Descartes‘ framework, joining mind and body would render real distinction 
impossible, and then it is not obvious that they are mind and body in the same sense as 
before the union. Given this framework, the critiques of commentators like Sommers 
and Arnauld seem convincing. Has Descartes gone too far in his real distinction? How is 
it possible for mind and body to come together to form the human being? Despite the 
fact that this problem is highlighted precisely because of his explication of substances 
and attributes, I argue that the key for circumventing these problems lies in 
understanding the nuances of this very same relationship.  
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CHAPTER III 
A TRUE MODE OF UNION 
 
 To briefly state the problem again: the general question at hand concerns the 
nature of the human being. Descartes believes that the human being is a genuine unity, 
comprised of two distinct substances, mind and body. In addition to the difficulty 
conceiving of one thing as two things, a close look at Descartes‘ metaphysics indicates 
that it might not be possible for mind and body to be united at all. While Descartes 
believes that mind and body are united, he rarely discusses the mechanism by which this 
union is achieved. 
 The key to solving these difficulties, I argue, lies in a seeming offhand comment 
to Regius. This comment is one of the few where Descartes explicitly mentions the way 
in which mind and body are united. In January 1642, in response to Regius‘ erroneous 
public announcements concerning mind-body union, Descartes urges:  
You must say that [mind and body] are united not by position or disposition, as 
you assert in your last paper – for this too is open to objection and, in my 
opinion, quite untrue – but by a true mode of union (per verum modum unionis), 
as everyone agrees, though nobody explains what this amounts to, and so you 
need not do so either.
47
 
Regius‘ suggestion that mind and body are united by position or disposition is frequently 
understood to mean that mind and body are united accidentally. When faced with the 
tension between mind and body‘s real distinction and true union, Regius seems to 
attempt to lessen the force of these claims. Instead of defending the notion that mind and 
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body come together to form a true unity, Regius supposes that a better explanation 
would be to say that mind and body are perhaps united by position—that is, their unity 
can be accounted for by their close and intimate proximity to one another. Similarly 
Regius speculates that union might be the result of the disposition of mind and body to 
be associated with one another, another accidental kind of unity.  
Contrary to the idea that mind and body are united by position or disposition, 
Descartes says that mind and body are united through a mode of union. In the next 
chapter I will argue that this is claim is crucial for understanding how Descartes can hold 
real distinction and true union without contradiction. At present, however, it is important 
to first address those who might not take this claim seriously and then discuss various 
problems that emerge since it is not immediately evident that this claim is consistent 
with his metaphysical framework. The rest of this chapter will outline some problems 
with extrapolating the idea that union is a mode, and then it will respond to each 
difficulty in turn. 
 
A Mode of Union 
  
The passage quoted above from Descartes‘ letter to Regius is one place where 
commentators can easily question Descartes‘ sincerity. As noted earlier, commentators 
are often reluctant to give credence to comments such as this one because of the 
possibility that it is a stance held merely to appease opponents. Descartes recognizes this 
as the commonly held position, and so he tells Regius that no explanation is needed, and 
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his treatment fuels the temptation to write this off as insincere. That is, Descartes‘ 
confession that this claim is in accord with the standard view arguably supports the 
possible reading that he does not mean to hold this view but is merely telling Regius 
what to say to avoid trouble. Furthermore, Descartes allows Regius to bypass 
explanation of this claim, so one can be tempted to say that Descartes should be held to 
this same standard. If Regius and others who hold this view need not explain it, why 
should Descartes be responsible to provide his own account? 
Despite these concerns, there are good reasons to take this passage seriously and 
to demand explanation from Descartes. First, the political context of this letter 
legitimizes this passage's consideration. In this letter Descartes is attempting to help 
Regius avoid trouble with his opponents. Because the purpose is to help Regius espouse 
the correct view of mind-body union, it is unlikely that Descartes would give Regius 
advice that would fall prey to the same criticisms. Moreover, it is widely understood that 
Regius is a proponent of Descartes‘ views. In correcting Regius, Descartes‘ is also 
protecting his own public image. Because Descartes‘ reputation is also at stake, there is 
even more reason to think that Descartes would stand behind the claim that mind and 
body are united through a mode of union.  
Even though the political context provides some reasons to take this passage 
seriously, these considerations alone might not quiet the commentators who think 
Descartes is merely assuaging his opponents by appealing to a standard view. Indeed, he 
admits that everyone agrees that this is the correct explanation of mind-body union, and 
so it should be adopted. Furthermore, because everyone agrees and no one gives an 
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account of just how this mode of union works, Descartes does not require Regius to give 
any further explanation, nor might he feel that he himself has to provide an account 
either.  
I believe, however, that the claims here should be taken seriously, and that 
Descartes should not be allowed to escape explanation. Even though he admits that this 
is the standard view, there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Descartes is 
insincere. Perhaps most convincingly, recall that Descartes has his own sophisticated 
conceptions of substance, attributes, and the relation of modes to substances. Because he 
is correcting Regius not only to escape further criticism but also to ensure that Regius is 
not misconstruing his own views, it stands to reason that any claim pertaining to modes 
must also be in accord with Descartes‘ other claims about modes, their function, and 
their relationship to the substances mind and body.  
Of course, there is always the possibility that Descartes did not mean to hold this 
view, but commentators do Descartes (and themselves) a disservice when they reject the 
one place where he explicitly cites the mechanism by which union is achieved. Scholars 
might be persuaded to take this claim seriously if its seeming inconsistency could be 
reconciled with the details of Descartes metaphysics after all. I suggest that, even though 
a variety of problems emerge by calling union a mode, it is still possible to show how it 
is in keeping with other aspects of Descartes‘ philosophy. The rest of this chapter will be 
dedicated to investigating the plausibility of calling union a mode.  
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Problems and Solutions 
 
The first problem to address is whether union is an attribute or a relation. If it 
were an attribute, it would be a peculiar one, since it seems to require two entities. It 
would be an attribute unlike color, for example, which clearly requires only one object. 
The attribute of union requires two entities for intelligibility, for a substance with the 
attribute of union is joined to something else. Because of this, commentators suggest that 
union is a two-place relation where the union is explained simply as mind and body 
being in a particular relation to one another. This account is appealing because it avoids 
the various difficulties with calling union a mode. As a superadded relation, union just is 
the fact that mind and body stand in this particular relation and so no further explanation 
is needed. This interpretation has the added virtue of highlighting the way union is 
unlike other attributes in how  it requires two entities.  
This account, though convenient, falls short in a few ways. First, describing 
union as a relation has no true explanatory power. It might accurately describe the state 
of mind and body insofar as they are in a kind of relation and insofar as they are united, 
but it does not give an account of the way in which they are united. To say that mind and 
body are united because they stand in a union relation to one another is a mere 
restatement of what Descartes finds obvious to the senses: that mind and body are 
united. Second, construing union this way is dangerously similar to Regius‘ claim that 
mind and body are in a particular relation to one another by mere position. Of course, 
Regius might have had a number of ideas in mind when he suggests unity by position; 
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perhaps mind and body are united just when they are really close together, or perhaps 
even co-extended with one another (as other commentators suggest). Descartes 
adamantly refuses Regius‘ proposal that mind and body are united by position, and so it 
seems that one who believes mind and body to be united by relation would have to 
explain how a union relation is different from an account where unity is achieved 
through position. Finally, and perhaps most compelling, is the fact that Descartes says 
that the union of mind and body is a mode. To say that it is a mode is to say that it is an 
attribute. If one takes Descartes‘ claims seriously, this explicit admission must be 
accounted for within his larger philosophy. Commentators who construe union as 
anything other than a mode are committed to denying the sincerity of this passage (and 
perhaps this entire letter to Regius). While many are comfortable doing so, we saw 
earlier that this is a convenient but indefensible position. Moreover, construing union as 
a relation does not get us further in our attempt to understand how Descartes can hold 
true union and real distinction. As a relation, there are no obvious implications for true 
union or real distinction. Union, then, should not be interpreted as a mere relation 
according to Descartes. Adhering to his explicit claim, I will later argue that Descartes‘ 
careful recognition of union as a mode holds the explanatory power that is absent if one 
considers union a relation.  
 Taking this idea that union is a mode seriously, the next set of objections arises 
from the attempt to square union with Descartes‘ metaphysics of substances. In order to 
show how union as a mode is consistent with Descartes‘ philosophy, I have to show (1) 
that it is in accord with his definition of attributes, (2) how union is intelligible as an 
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attribute of substance and to which substance union properly belongs, and (3) whether a 
mode can be shared by two substances.  
 The first concern is the easiest to overcome. Recall Descartes‘ distinction 
between a substance and its attributes. A substance is an entity that requires only divine 
concurrence for its existence. An attribute depends upon a substance for existence. That 
is, an attribute cannot be thought of without thinking of the substance in which in 
inheres. For example, one cannot conceive of the attribute shape without conceiving it as 
inhering in an extended substance. Union is in accord with this definition. It is not a 
substance itself, because it depends upon substance for its intelligibility. One cannot 
conceive of union without also thinking of the substances in which it inheres, that is, one 
cannot think of union without thinking of the substances that are united.  
Once again, we run into the peculiar notion that union needs two substances for 
intelligibility. Although it is slightly odd, union still fits within Descartes‘ conception of 
attributes. While union must be a notion that includes the joining of two things, one can 
easily consider the attribute union as an attribute of mind or body. One can imagine 
extended substance without the union attribute, in which case it would exist 
independently of mind. One can also imagine body with the attribute union. In this case 
the body would be united to mind.
48
 The need for another substance does not prevent 
one from clearly and distinctly imagining extended substance with a mode of union. The 
                                                 
     48. Descartes makes some comments suggesting that the human mind must be joined to the 
human body (e.g., AT III 460; CSMK 200/  AT VII 78; CSM II 54.), but these passages are not 
directly relevant to the discussion at hand. It is important to note in passing, however, that 
Descartes does not allow for human minds and human bodies to be united to anything other than 
one another.  
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same would be true of mind: one can imagine mind with or without the attribute of 
union. Even though union reads like a two-place relation, it does not pose 
insurmountable difficulties when transposed upon Descartes‘ definition of attributes.  
This raises the next concern: the question of to which substance union rightly 
belongs. I answer that union must inhere in both substances mind and body. The last 
section went a long way in supporting this claim. Again recall that an attribute must refer 
to its principal property. This means that an attribute must be intelligible in reference to 
its principal property. Color, for example, is known to belong to extended substance 
because it is only intelligible when it inheres in an extended substance. But we just noted 
that there is no problem conceiving of union in either mind or body. Our ability to 
conceive of union as an attribute of both mind and body suggests that it properly belongs 
to both substances. Because Descartes has set up his metaphysical framework wherein 
the intelligibility of an attribute means that the attribute properly belongs to the 
substance to which it refers, the fact that union is intelligible to both substances means 
that both mind and body can contain this mode. There is no basis for denying the 
possibility that either substance be united through a mode of union.  
The final and most critical concern springs from the claim that when united in the 
human being, mind and body both contain the same mode. We saw that the real 
distinction of mind and body is based on one‘s ability to separate out all the attributes of 
one from all the attributes of another. One can make these distinctions because attributes 
are only intelligible to their respective principal properties. I have already argued that it 
is in accord with Descartes‘ intelligibility criteria that mind and body share the same 
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mode, but it is also useful to note that there is precedent for two different substances 
sharing modes. For example, Descartes mentions that all substances share a number of 
other peculiar attributes: ―The most general items which we regard as things are 
substance, duration, order, number and any other items of this kind which extend to all 
classes of things.‖49 Here  Descartes is attempting to delineate various objects of 
perception, and in doing so, he admits that there are items that extend to all classes of 
things. However, he goes on to specify that duration, order, and number are ―affections 
of things‖ or modes: 
We shall also have a very distinct understanding of duration, order and number, 
provided we do not tack onto them any concept of substance. Instead, we should 
regard the duration of a thing simply as a mode under which we conceive the 
thing in so far as it continues to exist. And similarly we should not regard order 
or number as anything separate from the things in which are ordered or 
numbered, but should think of them simply as modes under which we consider 
the things in question.50 
Akin to what the Medievalists called ‗transcendental‘ properties, Descartes notices that 
there are modes that extend to all things and are thus shared by all substances. Because 
his philosophy allows for these transcendental properties, my suggestion that union is an 
attribute of both mind and body is not so far afield after all. Of course, the parallel is not 
perfect, and I do not mean to suggest that union is a transcendental property that extends 
to all substances. I point out Descartes‘ admission of transcendental properties merely to 
show that—contrary to those who think that two substances cannot share a mode—
Descartes acknowledges certain modes that all substances have. At the very least, this 
                                                 
49. AT VIIIA 22; CSM I 208. 
 
50. AT VIIIA 26; CSM I 211. 
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precedent grounds my claim that union is a mode of both mind and body, especially 
when paired with the realization that union is in accord with Descartes‘ intelligibility 
criteria.  
 Even though Descartes‘ mention of transcendental properties lessens the 
absurdity of my claim, there is still one more devastating problem to address: is real 
distinction threatened by the suggestion that mind and body are united through a mode? 
If Descartes‘ suggestion to Regius means that mind has a mode of union and that body 
has a mode of union, it does not seem possible that mind and body can be separated from 
one another. One would not be able to separate out all the attributes of one from the 
attributes of the other, and so one could not know that mind and body are really distinct. 
Indeed under Descartes‘ framework mind and body would not be really distinct. 
 I take up this problem in the next chapter. I will argue that because union is a 
mode, it preserves real distinction in one sense but not in another. The seemingly 
devastating problem that mind and body are not separable when united by a mode can 
thus be explained as precisely the kind of union that Descartes needs in order for his 
belief in the human being as an ens per se to hold. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RECONCILIATION 
 
The goal of this thesis is to explain how Descartes can possibly hold real 
distinction of mind and body and true union without contradiction. By detailing his 
metaphysics of substances and taking seriously his claim that the union of mind and 
body is achieved through a mode, we now have all the pieces to explain away this 
apparent inconsistency. In order to show how Descartes can hold both claims I will first 
show how real distinction is not threatened by union, and then I will show how true 
union can be achieved and maintained despite real distinction. Throughout, Descartes‘ 
understanding of union as a mode will play a central role. 
 
Real Distinction amidst Union  
 
 The ability to uphold real distinction amidst union hinges upon the ability to 
construe union as a mode in addition to noticing two different definitions of ‗real 
distinction‘ within Descartes‘ writings. Union understood as a mode means that this 
attribute is not an essential property of mind or body, and so they are able to be really 
distinct in the sense that they can exist apart from one another.  
We just saw that, despite initial appearances, union construed as a mode is 
consistent with Descartes‘ philosophy. Admittedly union is a mode that is unlike many 
others since it needs another substance to be intelligible, but this oddity does not render 
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union an incoherent attribute. It is still consistent with the definition for attributes that 
Descartes puts forth in the Principles. Furthermore, lest commentators still take issue 
with problems of mind and body‘s ability to contain the same mode, Descartes‘ 
admission of transcendental attributes sets the precedent for this possibility. These are 
properties that are contained within every substance, since they pertain to existence. 
Without attributes like duration, order, and number, a thing cannot be understood to 
exist. While this does not conclusively show that union is a mode, it does aid the 
argument insofar as it hints that the possibility of an attribute referring to more than one 
substance is not quite so far afield from Descartes‘ philosophy as one might think. The 
conclusive evidence for union as an attribute of both substances rests upon Descartes‘ 
proposed method for discerning the distinction between substances. When one 
encounters an attribute, one knows it belongs to a particular substance based in its ability 
to refer to that substance‘s principal property. Because there are no obvious problems 
conceiving of union as a mode of either body or mind, it must properly belong to both of 
them. At least, given Descartes‘ criteria, there is no reason to deny that union properly 
refers to one and not the other. Finally, some might argue that union is not a property at 
all. This stance is dissatisfying because in order to hold this interpretation, one must 
deny Descartes‘ explicit imperative to Regius that union is achieved through a mode.   
 In Chapter Two, we saw that a modal attribute is one that is characterized by its 
accidental nature. This is the crucial notion that allows the real distinction of mind and 
body. Because union is an accidental attribute, mind and body can exist apart from one 
another. Union is not an essential feature of either substance, and so one can still have a 
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clear and distinct idea of mind and body independently from one another. This ability to 
clearly and distinctly understand mind and body allows for the possibility that mind and 
body can exist apart.  
Real distinction understood in terms of one substance‘s ability to exist apart from 
another appears in Descartes‘ thought as early as the Meditations. This claim is crucial 
for his philosophy because it sets up implications  for his theological and 
epistemological concerns. Earlier I also noted that scholars often puzzle over why in the 
Meditations Descartes makes the weaker claim that mind and body can possibly exist 
apart, rather than the stronger claim that they actually exist apart. Given my 
interpretation of the mind-body union, we are now in a position to say why he makes 
only this weak claim. Descartes believes that union of mind and body is apparent 
through the senses. One does not perceive real distinction of mind and body clearly and 
distinctly, but one can have an idea of it. We also saw earlier that having an idea of real 
distinction ensures the possibility of a substance even though we might not yet know 
with certainty that it exists. This is the type of claim in which  Descartes is interested for 
his theological argument for the immortality of the soul. He does not need to say that 
mind and body are in fact really distinct; he only needs to show that it is possible for 
them to be so. When mind and body are united merely through a mode, one can clearly 
and distinctly have an idea of them existing apart from one another, since removing the 
accidental attribute does not change the essence of mind or body. 
 At this point it is important to notice that there are two different definitions of 
real distinction up and running. At times Descartes uses real distinction to express mind 
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and body‘s ability to exist apart from one another. At other times he uses the term to 
denote that one can separate out all attributes of one substance from the attributes of 
another. It is tempting to conflate these two definitions because of their intricate 
connection. They should not be conflated, however, because while one‘s ability to 
separate the attributes of one substance from another ensures the possibility of their real 
distinction, the converse is not the case. One substance‘s ability to exist apart from 
another does not entail that they share no attributes—provided, of course, that the shared 
attribute is accidental. The obvious examples of this (color, shape, even imagination) 
show how an attribute refers to its principal property alone. Again, Descartes‘ 
pedagogical emphasis does not preclude the possibility that an attribute can intelligibly 
refer to more than one substance.   
Once one notices that the two definitions for real distinction are not equivalent, 
the added notion that union is a mode explains how Descartes can hold real distinction 
even when mind and body are united. Because mind-body union is achieved through an 
accidental property, mind and body can enjoy real distinction—in the sense that they are 
able to exist apart from one another—without contradiction.  
Mind and body are not, however, distinct in the sense that they are completely 
separable from one another. Once mind and body share a mode, the attributes of one 
cannot all be separated out from the attributes of the other. Because this is the criterion 
for knowing that one substance is different from another, real distinction in this sense 
fails.  
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While Descartes can uphold real distinction amidst union in one sense, he cannot 
uphold the other. The ease with which these two definitions of real distinction are 
conflated plays a large role in the initial tension between true union and real distinction. 
Even though my proposal suggests one way in which real distinction is maintained 
amidst true union, it fails with the alternate definition.  
We are now in a position to solve our two final problems. First, if two substances 
share a mode, it seems that real distinction collapses in the sense that mind and body 
cannot be separated from one another. That is, one can no longer separate out all the 
attributes of one from all the attributes of the other. Second, how can there be true union 
amidst real distinction? If mind and body are united through an accidental property, the 
kind of union achieved is not the type of union that Descartes strives for. He explicitly 
avoids accidental union in favor of true or substantial union. To show how real 
distinction and true union can be held without contradiction, let us now turn to these 
final problems.  
 
True Union amidst Real Distinction 
 
 In order to show how real distinction and true union can be held with 
consistency, there are two main problems that emerge from my interpretation of 
Descartes. Threatening real distinction, there is the problem that when two substances 
share a mode, they are no longer really distinct. In the sense that one can no longer 
separate out one substance from another, real distinction simply cannot be achieved 
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under this model. In the previous section I argued that there are two definitions of real 
distinction, and that the iteration that is most important for Descartes‘ theology and 
epistemology is maintained despite this modal union. When union is based on an 
accidental property, mind and body can be thought of clearly and distinctly, and so with 
the goodness and power of God their ability to exist apart is secure. Even so, an adequate 
solution must address the definition of real distinction that Descartes does not achieve. 
While the conflation of these two definitions causes most of the tension between the 
desire to hold real distinction and true union, it is within his quest for the human being‘s 
nature that he locates the resolution of the issue. Indeed recognizing the failure of real 
distinction because of the modal union is essential for understanding how he can explain 
true union.  
 The second major problem is that when union is understood as a mode, it results 
in an accidental union. Descartes adamantly refuses this possibility. He wants the human 
being to be an ens per se, an entity in self, one thing—not two. If union is accidental, 
Descartes‘ human being is not a true unity but a mere heap or aggregate. Hoffman 
notices that Descartes could avoid this problem by proposing that the human being is an 
ens per se when union is essential to at least one of its component substances.
51
 Hoffman 
subsequently rejects this picture, and he is right to do so since it is not intelligible to 
ascribe an essential attribute of union to either mind or body. Furthermore, this 
suggestion would also deny the possibility of real distinction by either definition. 
Seeking a notion of unity that is more robust, Hoffman argues for a trialist interpretation. 
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No doubt he was right to reject the idea of an essential union attribute, but, I argue, this 
does not require that we adopt a trialist reading. Regarding the true union of the human 
being, then, the problem requiring explanation is just how this accidental mode of union 
results in a substantial unity.  
As I have previously noted, unity by position, disposition, or mode is ruled out 
by Descartes‘ comment to Regius that mind and body ―are united not by position or 
disposition, […] but by a true mode of union,‖52 because he does not want the unity of 
the human being to be merely accidental. If we are to believe that Descartes‘ issue with 
unity in this passage is because of the accidental nature of positional or dispositional 
union, why would he posit another explanation for unity that is also considered 
accidental? It would appear as though Descartes would be chastising Regius for 
suggesting that mind and body are united accidentally, only to suggest—in the very 
same sentence—a different accidental way that mind and body are united.  
Instead, his response suggests that there is a meaningful difference between 
positional or dispositional unity and the unity achieved by a mode. I have argued that 
construing union as a mode of substance is a better alternative than unity by position or 
disposition because—when paired with his substance and attribute framework—it results 
not in a mere accidental union, but in a true or substantial one. Furthermore, I have 
argued that scholars are mistaken to believe that a union based on an accidental property 
necessarily results in an accidental union. Within Descartes‘ framework, it does the 
opposite.  
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Recall that in the last section we saw that when mind and body are united 
through a mode of union, they are no longer separable. This is because in order for one 
to know that they are really distinct, one must be able to separate out all the attributes of 
one from all the attributes of the other. By positing a shared attribute, it is no longer 
possible to separate out all attributes. Mind and body both contain union, and so when 
joined in this way the union attribute of mind is not distinct from the union attribute of 
body. The result is a confused perception of mind and body when they are united. 
Descartes explicitly admits this when he acknowledges that when mind and body are 
united, one cannot have a clear and distinct perception of mind and body: 
finally what belongs to the union of the soul and the body is known only 
obscurely by the intellect alone or even by the intellect aided by the imagination, 
but it is known very clearly by the senses. That is why people who never 
philosophize and use only their senses have no doubt that the soul moves the 
body and that the body acts on the soul. They regard both of them as a single 
thing, that is to say, they conceive of their union; because to conceive of the 
union between two things is to conceive them as one single thing.
53
 
The union of mind and body is not known clearly and distinctly, but only obscurely. It is 
known obscurely precisely because one cannot separate all attributes of mind from 
attributes of body. The unity of mind and body, then, is evident to the senses. This 
sensory explanation gives further credence to the claim that the human being is really 
one thing.  
When we remember that a substance is defined by its attributes and can only be 
understood as distinct from another substance when all of its attributes are separable, it is 
clear that the union of mind and body results in one thing, not two. In this context, 
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Descartes can justifiably claim that the true union of mind and body result in an ens per 
se.  
Commentators who believe that a modal union results in an accidental union thus 
err when they fail to see the implications of this view in light of his unique substance 
metaphysics. Again paying close attention to subjects of predication, it is the case that 
union is an accidental mode of the substances mind and body, but this does not mean 
that basing union on these accidental properties results in an accidental union. Given the 
nuances of Descartes‘ metaphysics, union through a mode has substantive repercussions 
that are not present in, say, union by position or disposition. So while union is accidental 
to the subjects mind and body, it is not accidental but rather essential to the human 
being. This picture is in accord with Descartes‘ framework as well since the human 
being would not exist without this union.   
Earlier I mentioned that scholars wonder about the weak claim that mind and 
body can exist apart, rather than the claim that they actually exist apart. Again, my 
proposal offers a solution. Because mind and body are truly united, they do not exist 
apart when joined to unite the human being. Similarly, his note on how we perceive the 
union of  the human being  suggests that we perceive it as one entity because it is one 
entity. Suddenly the weak claim that Descartes makes in the Meditations can be read as a 
calculated one that is consistent with the nuances of the way in which mind and body are 
united.  
 Finally, referring back to the two main problems addressed in this section, when 
true union is achieved, it still does not threaten real distinction. Of course, Descartes can 
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achieve only real distinction in the sense that mind and body can exist apart, but this 
should be satisfying since it is the type needed to uphold his theological and 
epistemological concerns. Additionally, the way in which union as a mode prevents the 
complete separability of mind and body is exactly the kind of union Descartes espouses 
for the human being. When union is a mode, Descartes can say that mind and body are 
really distinct and he can also say that they are substantially united in the human being.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The merits of my proposal hearken back to the problems set out in the first 
chapter. This interpretation is promising because it takes seriously the various—even 
apparently contradictory—claims that Descartes makes about the human being. Instead 
of retreating to a position that denies one or both claims in order to ease the tension, my 
proposal seeks to explain how these competing claims stand under Descartes‘ 
philosophy.  
 It is not easy to reconcile these views, and commentators including Paul Hoffman 
offer a variety of promising proposals. Ultimately, though, the suggestion that mind-
body union should be understood within a hylomorphic framework is dissatisfying 
because Descartes never explicitly explains union this way, although he had a variety of 
opportunities to do so. In addition to the knowledge that Descartes frequently distanced 
his ideas from the Aristotelian tradition, explaining union through hylomorphism can 
easily take readers uncomfortably outside the bounds of traditional Cartesian 
interpretations.  
 Similarly, there is much debate surrounding the extent to which Descartes meant 
to propose a trialist view, where the human being is a third type of substance. The most 
promising aspect of this suggestion is that it highlights the pervasive ambiguity that runs 
through Descartes‘ discussion of the human being. He refers to it as an ‗entity‘ and as a 
‗complete thing.‘ Since Descartes uses the terms ‗substance‘ and ‗thing‘ interchangeably 
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at times, scholars who posit trialism have good reason to do so. While he never explicitly 
refers to the human being as a third substance, many commentators wonder if Descartes 
is nonetheless committed to such a view. Still, like a hylomorphic interpretation, 
commentators are justified in their hesitation to adopt trialism. Even with rampant 
ambiguity, Descartes‘ dualism remains the commonly held interpretation.  
 My suggestion that the mind-body union is best understood through Descartes‘ 
letter to Regius in 1642 obviates the need to take a definitive stance on either of these 
controversial views. I argued that a modal union is consistent with Descartes‘ philosophy 
when one delves into his detailed conception of substances. Even while union as a mode 
is not obviously consistent with his larger philosophy upon a cursory read, interpreting 
union this way reveals a depth and sophistication to Descartes‘ metaphysics that results 
in a more cohesive picture than hylomorphism or trialism can produce.  
 There are, however, new lines of inquiry that emerge from my proposal. First it 
will be important to take a closer look into the various types of attributes in Cartesian 
metaphysics. Union is a peculiar attribute in that it reads more like a two-place relation 
than an attribute like color or shape. It would be useful to investigate if there are other 
attributes that function this same way, or if union is singularly peculiar.  
Also regarding attributes, my proposal raises the genuine concern that Descartes‘ 
admission of transcendental properties might collapse his entire metaphysical 
framework. If indeed his epistemology is based upon his ability have an idea of mind 
really distinct from body, it seems that it would never be possible to separate mind and 
body because of attributes like duration, order, and number. Since these attributes pertain 
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to all substances, it is not possible to separate all attributes of one from attributes of 
another. It is possible that Descartes‘ epistemology is doomed by this catch. He does not 
appear overly concerned, however, with this problem, and so it bears further 
investigation. It is possible that he did not notice this problem, but it is also possible that 
he did not dedicate time to it because of the way it is resolved by other aspects of his 
philosophy.   
Finally, despite my belief that this reading is promising because it circumvents 
the need to take a stance on trialism, I can also imagine ways in which this reading 
supports a trialist view. One of the greatest obstacles to trialism is that each substance 
must have one principal property that constitutes its nature and essence. Hoffman argues 
that a substance can have more than one principal property, but with my reading he need 
not go so far. It is possible to consider union the principal property of the human being. 
It would be in accord with Descartes‘ requirement that the principal property constitute 
the nature and essence of a substance—for without it, the human being would cease to 
exist. It would also alleviate Hoffman‘s need to argue for both thinking and extension as 
principal properties of the human being since union would subsume both beneath it. 
Much more work would have to be done to discern this potential. If it were the case that 
union provided Hoffman and others with the principal property they need for a trialist 
reading, my proposal would, I think, grant support to a trialist view since it would not 
seem so incongruent with Descartes‘ metaphysics after all. Insofar as my interpretation 
is based on the details of Descartes‘ metaphysics, it can be argued that a trialist reading 
that makes use of union as a mode of mind and body and yet the principal property of 
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the human being is not so inconsistent after all. Again, I do not mean to support a trialist 
view, and I do believe that my proposal circumvents the need to take a definitive stance. 
I merely offer this suggestion as one possible implication of construing union as a mode.   
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